1. That the September 2002 fish kill, that resulted in the loss of over 34,000 fish, mostly fall Chinook but including 344 Federally-listed adult coho salmon, was a direct result of relying on the adoption of a single-species management approach for coho;
2. That there is a lack of essential habitat modeling. In the case of species that are extremely rare in the Klamath River, like coho salmon, suitable habitat availability and habitat modeling are extremely important tools for species recovery;
3. That there are deficiencies in the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBR)’s 10-year Biological Assessment (BA) and resulting Biological Opinion (BO) that govern Klamath Project Operations with respect to compliance with the Federal Endangered Species Act. (ESA);
4. That the completion of the Hardy Phase II report has been delayed. We urge the timely completion of this report, so that it may form the foundation for future downstream water flow management;
5. That the scientific standards and associated burden of proof used by the National Academy of Sciences/National Research Council (NAS/NRC) are incompatible with the philosophy and intent of the ESA, which requires under law that current policy pursue a precautionary approach and reduction of risk to endangered species in the absence of complete data. Collection of such data may be cost-prohibitive and take additional time, which may, in the meantime, lead to continued fish kills and reductions in coho salmon population size;
6. That the approach taken by the NAS/NRC ignores the healthy river approach advocated by current science that recognizes the best approach to protection of instream uses is adherence to the natural hydrograph as much as possible, because it protects all aquatic species and their reproductive behavior, and more importantly, the geomorphology necessary to support a healthy river ecosystem;
7. That, to more fully understand the effects of current water management, a detailed economic study of the impacts of water diversions on recreational, commercial, and tribal fisheries, and associated cultural resources and support industries, is needed. Currently, such a comprehensive study is lacking. Even though the NAS/NRC report will focus on coho, we believe that a final assessment should include a comprehensive evaluation of the impacts on all Klamath River fisheries.
8. That the NAS/NRC should not complete its final report until the following three critical reports are completed and available:

U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) report on “Estimate of Mortality”. We understand that this report should be finished in the near future.

USFWS report on “Causative Factors of the Fish Die Off”. We understand that this report should be finished in the near future.

California Department of Fish and Game (CDFG) final fish kill assessment report. The CDFG is currently drafting a final report on the fish kill.

We believe that an NAS/NRC review, without first reviewing the information within these three critical reports listed above, would represent an incomplete evaluation of the most recent pertinent science. The NAS/NRC should not complete its report until the this information is made available; and

9. That the various Tribal Fisheries programs within the Klamath Basin have extensive experience and information relevant in the NAS/NRC review. We therefore strongly encourage the NAS/NRC, in their review and analysis, to aggressively seek out and include all applicable published and unpublished data and reports produced by the various Tribal Fisheries programs and other science-based organizations within the Klamath Basin.

The Fish Kill of 2002

The WDAFS believes that the recent fish kill, where over 34,000 fish-died, including over 32,500 Chinook salmon, should be taken as a clear warning signal that current management strategies are inadequate to protect the fisheries of the Klamath River. Adult fish kills in the Klamath River have not been observed in historical time. In addition, fish kills in systems unaltered by humans are extremely rare.

The causes of the Klamath River fish kill are complex, involving several factors that came together simultaneously with tragic results. The one factor that is the most significant is flows over Iron Gate Dam, and resultant flows in the Lower Klamath River, which were substantially less than what the best available scientific information indicates is necessary to sustain healthy aquatic resources. Low flows occurred not only during August and September, 2002, but also throughout 2002, which may have had devastating effects on future production of Klamath Basin fisheries resources.

We note that the USBR 2002 and 2003 Operations plans are largely based on the recommendations of the NRC report(1), which clearly focused only on coho salmon, and explicitly stated that its recommendations were not meant to be applied to other species. We believe that it is highly likely that the 2002 fish kill, which was unprecedented on the Klamath, was a result of a flawed, single-species management approach. Even though the primary species affected was Chinook salmon, a total of over 344 coho were killed as well (Guillen 2003)(2). In addition, these counts may underestimate the actual number of dead fish by as much as 50%.(3)

The reason we conclude that the USBR is using a single species only management approach is because the Biological Assessment (BA) and the resulting Biological Opinion (BO on the USBR’s water operations, with some small exceptions, follow the NRC’s recommendations for coho salmon exclusively. The Klamath River is home to many other species besides coho salmon, but the NRC report explicitly limited itself to addressing coho salmon in the lower Basin and suckers of the upper Basin. When advised of its tribal trust obligation to protect other species, such as Chinook salmon, steelhead, green sturgeon, lamprey, and coastal cutthroat trout, the USBR responded by adding an arbitrary amount of water (20,000 acre-ft) to the flow schedule. Then, during the summer of 2002, the USBR removed the water allocation by re-classifying the water year type from “Below Average” to “Dry”, thereby severely reducing August and September flows; this action was not covered by the USBR’s BA or subsequent BO. The USBR has not provided a credible scientific rationale on how the 2002 Klamath Project Operations Plan would provide sufficient flows to protect downstream fisheries resources other than coho salmon.

The method for determining what flows would be delivered to agriculture and also protect upper Klamath Lake resources, downstream Tribal resources, aquatic ecosystems that support coho, and other commercially valuable species was arbitrary and involved a high degree of risk to non-agricultural resources. Management decisions clearly placed the entire amount of this risk on downstream and Upper Klamath Lake resources. Flows to protect downstream resources were curtailed in mid-season, but no corresponding cuts were made to agricultural deliveries. Consequently, there was no consideration given to the appropriate distribution of risk to the various resources. As a result, downstream resources effectively assumed all the risks associated with severe alteration to the natural hydrograph, which probably resulted in the unprecedented fish kill described in this letter.

The cause of the fish kill is still under investigation by various agencies and tribal fisheries programs. However, several facts about the kill point toward inadequate flow, combined with a higher than average salmon spawning run, as the main factor causing this kill.

1. Although many point to poor water quality conditions as a causative factor in this kill, water quality parameters were not out of the normal range of environmental variability. Water temperatures monitored by the Yurok Tribe in cooperation with USFWS appeared to be within the range seen in recent years when there were no fish kills (Figure 1). Dissolved oxygen levels during 2002 were also within a range conducive to adult salmonid survival and migration (Figure 2). Certainly, the temperatures were at levels that could exacerbate disease problems; however, the evidence indicates that it is probable that the fish kill was exacerbated by high fish densities that resulted from delays in upstream migration, most likely due to reduced river volumes and depths caused by low flows.
2. As indicated by Yurok Tribal elders and examination of historical records, the river has had much larger runs historically, with no such fish kills observed. Although the river has had lower flows in the recent past, no fish kills occurred. However, at no time in the recent past, has there been a combination of a relatively large run size (18% larger than the average run from 1981-2002) and low flow such as was recorded in 2002 (Figure 2). In situations where large numbers of fish are concentrated, either by migrational delay or other factors, outbreaks of “ich” or other diseases, such as columnaris, have caused large fish kill events in other systems(4), notably in British Columbia in the Skeena River system with sockeye salmon. Low flows were also implicated in fish kills associated with columnaris in the Rogue River in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s(5). It should be noted that in the case of the Skeena River, mechanical blockage of fish migration led to the large concentration of fish and outbreak of ich.

Figure 1. Comparison of maximum daily water temperatures measured at Terwar (Klamath) gage (2001 and 2002) and Omagar Trap.

Figure 2. Minimum and average daily dissolved oxygen concentrations measured at Terwar gage (2002).

Figure 3. Scatter-plot of in-river run size and flow measured at the USGS Klamath Gage(6,7). The estimated run size of 2002 clearly stands out as a year with low flows and a relatively large in-river run size.

The WDAFS strongly urges the Departments of Interior (DOI) and Commerce (DOC) to take an approach to Klamath River flow management that more fairly distributes the risk to natural and agricultural resources. We also encourage the NRC to give full consideration to this level of risk as it applies to all species potentially affected in its next Klamath River review. Uncertainties, risk factors, objective assessments of unknown factors, and consequences all need to be considered in the water management decision-making process. For example, large-scale departures from the natural hydrograph carry substantial risks, and it is highly likely that this contributed to the 2002 fish kill event on the Klamath River.

The WDAFS strongly believes that it is time to adopt a different management strategy on the Klamath, and in other river and lake systems around the country. Instead of those people who depend on fisheries resources for their living being required to prove that all water that comes downstream is beneficial to fisheries resources, there needs to be a shift toward adoption of a precautionary principle of proving that large-scale depletions are not The WDAFS strongly urges the Departments of Interior (DOI) and Commerce (DOC) to take an approach to Klamath River flow management that more fairly distributes the risk to natural and agricultural resources. We also encourage the NRC to give full consideration to this level of risk as it applies to all species potentially affected in its next Klamath River review. Uncertainties, risk factors, objective assessments of unknown factors, and consequences all need to be considered in the water management decision-making process. For example, large-scale departures from the natural hydrograph carry substantial risks, and it is highly likely that this contributed to the 2002 fish kill event on the Klamath River.

The WDAFS strongly believes that it is time to adopt a different management strategy on the Klamath, and in other river and lake systems around the country. Instead of those people who depend on fisheries resources for their living being required to prove that all water that comes downstream is beneficial to fisheries resources, there needs to be a shift toward adoption of a precautionary principle of proving that large-scale depletions are not The WDAFS strongly urges the Departments of Interior (DOI) and Commerce (DOC) to take an approach to Klamath River flow management that more fairly distributes the risk to natural and agricultural resources. We also encourage the NRC to give full consideration to this level of risk as it applies to all species potentially affected in its next Klamath River review. Uncertainties, risk factors, objective assessments of unknown factors, and consequences all need to be considered in the water management decision-making process. For example, large-scale departures from the natural hydrograph carry substantial risks, and it is highly likely that this contributed to the 2002 fish kill event on the Klamath River.

The WDAFS strongly believes that it is time to adopt a different management strategy on the Klamath, and in other river and lake systems around the country. Instead of those people who depend on fisheries resources for their living being required to prove that all water that comes downstream is beneficial to fisheries resources, there needs to be a shift toward adoption of a precautionary principle of proving that large-scale depletions are not harming terrestrial, riparian, and aquatic ecosystems. Agricultural water use needs to be examined with the same scientific rigor that flow needs for fisheries resources are. Both uses are a source of livelihood for people, and responsible management of this resource demands that all factors be considered. Current management calls for agricultural deliveries to be determined only by demand. In other words, farmers of the Klamath Project are gently urged to conserve, but their actual water use and legitimate needs remain to be examined thoroughly. We believe that the ultimate solution for the citizens of the Klamath Basin lies in progressive solutions that more fairly distribute the risk of uncertainty among all use sectors.

Related to this issue is the need for the USBR and the NAS/NRC to fully evaluate the true impacts of their project on humans in the Klamath River watershed. To more fully understand the effects of water management, a detailed economic study is needed of the impacts of water diversions on recreational, commercial, and tribal fisheries and associated cultural resources and support industries. The current paradigm involves farming versus protection of endangered species. Although very important, this approach again neglects the impact on the salmonid and non-salmonid fisheries and associated economic and human cultural resources of the various downstream users. This fish kill is another example of the shortcomings associated with single species management.

2002 Biological Assessment and Biological Opinion

The WDAFS strongly urges the USBR and NOAA Fisheries (NOAA) to re-examine the BA and BO that currently govern Klamath Project operations.

Specifically, we would like to see a detailed analyses of the risks to the continued existence of coho salmon from delaying implementation of needed river flows for up to 10 years, as well as an assessment of the risk resulting from the potential that flows specified in the BA will not actually be realized. We would also like to see an analysis of the impacts from re-classification of water year types during mid-summer. This is a major digression from the proposed action, with clear implications to coho salmon, yet was never analyzed in the BA or the BO. We also believe that additional analyses of the risks posed to the overall essential functions of the riverine ecosystem that supports coho salmon, including effects on prey species, migrational barriers, and spawning behavior needs to be critically examined.

The WDAFS does not agree with the perceived NRC Committee recommendation that, absent conclusive scientific evidence, the Project should be managed as it was in 1990-2000. Instead, we believe that NOAA must also determine and consider expectations about the resulting effects on Klamath River coho salmon populations based on the best available information as required under ESA. NOAA should not ignore selected information simply because it does not meet various standards applied by various interests. The NAS has failed even to define the standard that should be used.

Finally, NOAA should consider potential project operations in the context of the tremendous uncertainty as to the status of the species, including examination of what other activities that could adversely affect the fish (e.g., activities not subject to direct ESA section 7 consultations) and are reasonably likely to occur. This includes, but is not limited to, the cumulative effect of substantial water management activities outside of the Project boundaries upstream of Iron Gate Dam (e.g. Willamson and Sprague River), and downstream of Iron Gate Dam (e.g. Trinity, Shasta and Scott River, agricultural diversions), water quality management (TMDL, permitting), tributary impacts (e.g. forestry practices, diversions). Recent litigation and court decisions have modified the implementation of the original Trinity River Environmental Impact Statement Record of Decision (ROD). The relationship of the new Trinity River implementation schedule on downstream Klamath River fishery resources, including ESA-listed coho salmon, needs to be evaluated.

Klamath River Flow Studies

The underlying theme behind the debate over the flow needs of the Klamath River is scientific uncertainty. Realizing a need for more certainty, the Klamath River Fisheries Task Force completed a comprehensive flow study plan in 1999-2000 using a completely open, collaborative process. The USFWS used these recommendations to make funding requests to pay for instream flow studies to the DOI. To date, this plan has been funded through the Department of Interior at approximately 17% of the funding request . We urge you to make every effort to ensure that these flow studies, intended to aid in the responsible management of this precious resource, are funded to their full requested budget amount.

Conclusion

Responses of large river systems, like the Klamath River, to environmental changes are complex and difficult to predict. However, the considerable scientific uncertainty with regard to how water management affects fish must not be used to justify a status quo water management operation that is distributing nearly all of the risk to one sector of the ecosystem or one portion of the stakeholders. A full description and assessment of the economic and cultural tradeoffs is needed.

We urge the Secretaries of the DOI and DOC to reconsider their strategies with regard to Klamath River water management and place equal scrutiny on upstream water uses. We also strongly encourage the DOI to facilitate the timely completion and distribution of the USFWS “Causative Factors” and “Fish Die -Off estimate” and the Hardy Phase II reports, so that this information can be fully considered by the NAS/NRC.

We strongly encourage the NAS/NRC to delay production of any final assessment and recommendation on future Klamath River flows until the final CDFG/USFWS and Hardy Phase II reports are completed. We also encourage the NAS/NRC to aggressively seek out and include all applicable published and unpublished scientific data and reports produced by the various tribal fisheries or other fisheries management programs within the Klamath Basin in their review and analysis. The respective sponsoring agencies, including DOI, should provide sufficient resources to complete these reports within a reasonable time.

The DOI, NOAA and CDFG should also require their staffs to produce manuscripts based on portions of these final reports in refereed peer-reviewed fishery science journals. These actions would help insure the widest distribution, full disclosure and production of scientifically-defensible publications.

Klamath River fisheries resources need flows adequate to prevent a reoccurrence of the tragic fish kill of 2002. We urge the DOI and NOAA to seek solutions that do not place the burden of proof and risk on one group at the expense of other groups. We also urge the Administration to request that the NAS/NRC consider all sources of scientific data, including published and unpublished data, and facilitate the completion of the appropriate DOI-sponsored reports for consideration in the final assessment.

We appreciate the opportunity to provide input on this important issue and are ready to assist in information transfer or expert consultation whenever the need arises.

Sincerely,
Donald D. McDonald, President
Western Division of the American Fisheries Society

        1. NRC (National Research Council). 2002. Scientific evaluation of Biological Opinions on endangered and threatened fishes in the Klamath River Basin: Interim report. National Academy Press, Washington DC.

       2. Guillen. 2003. Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Humboldt Chapter of the American Fisheries Society. Arcata, CA.

       3. American Fisheries Society 1992. Investigation and valuation of fish kills. AFS Special Publication 24. AS. Bethesda, MD.

       4. Traxler, G.S. , J. Richard, T.E. McDonald. 1998. Ichthyophthirius multifiliis (Ich) epizootics in spawning sockeye salmon in British Columbia, Canada. Journal of Aquatic Animal Health. 10:143-151.

       5. Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife 1981. Rogue Basin Fisheries Evaluation Program Progress Report.

       6. USFWS has requested $4.5 million per year for the past two years, but has been allocated only $750,000.

       7. Stacy, G. B. 2003. Megatable: Klamath River basin fall Chinook salmon spawner escapement, in-river harvest and runs-size estimates, 1978-2002. California Department of Fish and Game, Redding, California.

       8. USFWS has requested $4.5 million per year for the past two years, but has been allocated only $750,000.